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Thirty-five Years After Berkelman: Seeking a
New Debate About Ability Grouping
by MATT CHAYT*

Introduction
Tracking and ability grouping are controversial educational
strategies that have garnered substantial attention from social
scientists, lawyers, and others. They emerged in the early twentieth
century as outgrowths of a consensus that they would facilitate a
future workforce enhanced by more focused preparation for
particular fields or tasks.' Ability grouping is defined here as the use
of testing and other criteria to identify "gifted" (i.e., intellectually
above average) students for placement in accelerated and/or betterfunded schools or programs. After a lull in its use, ability grouping
returned in the mid-1950s.2 A Harvard Law Review note offered
several reasons for the resurgence:
The Cold War with the Soviet Union prompted a movement to
separate gifted students in order to provide them with a special
education. Many southern school districts adopted tracking as a
means of circumventing desegregation orders. Finally, northern
cities responded to a large migration of blacks by increasing the
amount of ability grouping in their systems.'

* J.D. Candidate 2010, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I
would like to thank my family, the entire membership of HCLQ, Professor Lois Schwartz,
Dean Keith Wingate, and Professor Osagie Obasogie for their support and guidance. I
would like to express my special appreciation to Adrienne Ratner for her essential
comments and suggestions.
1. Angelia Dickens, Revisiting Brown v. Board of Education: How Tracking Has
ResegregatedAmerica's Public Schools, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 469, 471 (1996).
2. Note, Teaching Inequality: The Problem of Public School Tracking, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1318,1323 (1989).
3. Id. (footnotes omitted).
[617]
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In other words, ability grouping made a comeback during a very
specific political and racial moment in history.
The objective of this Note is to nudge school districts, parents,
students, courts, and other stakeholders toward a more critical
conversation about ability grouping, particularly the kind presently
used to choose students for selective public high schools like Lowell
High School in San Francisco, and Thomas Jefferson High School for
Science and Technology ("Jefferson High") in Virginia. I begin by
offering background about a seminal case on school tracking. Next, I
offer a brief overview of the litigation over the San Francisco Unified
School District. Next, I explore one case, Berkelman v. San Francisco
Unified School District,' in depth to explore how it critiqued ability
grouping on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. The Note continues
with a discussion of Supreme Court jurisprudence on race and
education-jurisprudence which I argue, in its efforts to be "colorblind," has only managed to be blind to the persistent racial
disparities that pervade American life. Finally, I argue that in light of
contemporary insights about race (such as those from critical race
theory), we must continue to explore why and how we assess
students for ability, and ask whether racially neutral ability grouping
is actually possible.
This Note aims to explore the acknowledged dangers that ability
grouping presents and its potential to run afoul of equal protection.
As seen in the litigation over Lowell-and perhaps in the absence of
litigation over Jefferson High-the benefits of ability grouping have
long been assumed to outweigh any slight disadvantages.6
Nevertheless, the disadvantages, however "slight, are significant, and
potentially violate the doctrine of equal protection. For example, in
the mid-1980s, shortly after Jefferson High opened as an academically
elite magnet school, Fairfax County conceded that as a result of the
new school's opening, small pockets of students left behind at other
public schools in the district no longer had access to accelerated
courses because identified eligible students no longer constituted a

4. Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1974).
5. Though it is not susceptible of any one definition, Critical Race Theory has been
described as the genre of critical legal scholarship that "focuses on the relationship
between law and racial subordination in American society." Kimberle Crenshaw, A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and Politics, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 195, 213 n.7 (David Kairys ed., 1990).
6. Id. at 1268.
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large enough group to form an honors class. The push in the 1980s to
establish public, academically elite magnet schools and rigorous
academic tracks existed in spite of studies at the time showing limited
benefit to ability grouping.8
Virtually all the legal analysis in the arena of public education
access hinges on the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment mandates that states not
deny "equal protection under the laws" to persons within their
jurisdictions. 10 The landmark Fourteenth Amendment decision
regarding education remains Brown v. Board of Education, declaring

that racially segregated public schools are constitutionally
unacceptable. 1'
In the decades following Brown, courts have
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment and Brown in various wayssometimes opposing racism, sometimes not.
Terminology is important in this discussion. The term "ability
grouping" and the programs with which it is typically associated have
become accepted features of public school systems in America. At
the same time, ability grouping is sometimes referred to as "tracking,"
which is perhaps typified in American educational history by the
regressive programs struck down in Hobson v. Hansen, a successful
1967 suit filed against the Washington, D.C. school system. 2 Magnet
schools were established in the 1960s and 1970s, largely with the goal
of achieving desegregation by attracting students from throughout the
district by offering special programs in the arts, technical arts, science,
or rigorous academics.
This Note focuses on ability grouping and academically elite
magnet schools. The goal of this Note is to ask whether tracking on a
small scale (as in the selective public high school context) truly cures
the problematic characteristics of tracking. The Note primarily uses
Lowell High School, a selective public high school located in San
Francisco, California, as a case study.

7. D'Vera Cohn, Honors Courses Remain Strong, Va. Report Says, WASH. POST,
Oct. 15, 1986, at C12.
8. Note, supra note 2, at 1323.
9.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954).
12. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
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Lowell became an academically selective high school in 1966.13
Lowell selectively admits students based on academic ability as
measured in part by a standardized test administered to eighth
graders. It is the foremost of several specialty high schools in San
Francisco,14 and has been referred to as one of the country's top high
schools." In 2008, over 2,000 students applied for the freshmen class
at Lowell, and over 1,150 of those students were rejected. 16 This
practice is an example of what is referred to as ability grouping (or, by
some, tracking). Despite the racially tinged history of ability
grouping, 7 courts have held that ability grouping is not a strict proxy
for race and, therefore, have given the practice a wide berth. 8 Courts
apply strict scrutiny only to state actions that make distinctions based
on suspect classes 19 or interfere with fundamental constitutional
rights, and ability is neither a facially suspect classification nor a
fundamental constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment. 2
Also informing this Note is my own high school, Jefferson High
in Alexandria, Virginia. Jefferson High is a selective public school
established in Virginia in stages over the late 1980s. Like Lowell,
Jefferson High uses a formal admissions process to admit students.
Although funded primarily through public funds from the State of
Virginia,21 Jefferson High is in a financial and curricular partnership

13. San Francisco Unified School District, Lowell History, http://www.sfusd.edu/
schwww/sch697/about/history.
14. San Francisco Unified School District, School Information, http://portal.sfusd.edu
/template/default.cfm?page=school info.profiles.
15. Terence Chea, Asian-Americans wary of new college admissions standards
University of Californiasystem officials say they're widening the applicantpool, THE STARLEDGER,Apr. 26, 2009, at 27.
16. San Francisco Unified School District, Lowell High School Profile 2007-2008,
http://www.sfusd.edu/schwww/sch697/about/profile/08Profile.pdf.
17. Dickens, supra note 1, at 471.
18. Note, supra note 2, at 1319.
19. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (alienage); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (race); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)
(national ancestry and ethnic origin).
20. But see infra Part V.
21. We will see that courts respond negatively to tracking programs that are racially
tainted, as in Hobson v. Hansen. But often, constitutional jurisprudence on the state level,
as well as the federal level, can make it more difficult to challenge the unequal distribution
of educational resources. In Virginia, where Jefferson High is located, a 1994 state
supreme court decision in response to a suit complaining of unequal funding for various
school districts, Scott v. Commonwealth, held that while education was a fundamental right
in the Virginia Constitution, "nowhere does the Constitution require equal, or
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with industry. The school was originally planned to include a
vocational element, but sponsoring companies persuaded Fairfax
County to abandon vocational training.22 As mentioned above,
Jefferson High does not explicitly seek, nor successfully achieve, any
desegregative purpose. Indeed, what has been called "colorblind"
jurisprudence has guaranteed that anyone trying to promote diversity
at Jefferson High will be stymied by the interpretations of the
Fourteenth Amendment that have held sway with the Supreme Court
in recent years.' Later in this Note, I examine the current Supreme
Court posture toward the Fourteenth Amendment and education.
I.

Hobson v. Hansen: A Seminal Tracking Case

A central case in the history of educational tracking and diversity
is Hobson v. Hansen,24 which overturned an academic tracking
practice in Washington, D.C. in 1967, on the grounds that it
intentionally discriminated against students in violation of due
process and of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Hobson considered a district-wide policy that separated students
in the Washington, D.C. school system into four academic tracks:
Honors, Regular, General, and "Special Academic." Superintendent
Dr. Carl Hansen argued that the tracking practice was a legitimate
pedagogical strategy not motivated by racial concerns. According to
Hansen, his tracking system was an expression of the principle that
"[e]very pupil in the school system must have the maximum
opportunity for self-development."25
Furthermore, District of
Columbia school officials argued that this tracking system was flexible
and encouraged students to move up.26
But the circuit court rejected the school district's arguments
about ability grouping and held that this classification system was a
proxy for segregation and discrimination.27 Circuit Judge Skelly

substantially equal, funding or programs among and within the Commonwealth's school
divisions." Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (1994).
22. David R. Gergen, Sending Companies to School, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Nov. 6, 1989, at 112.
23. Online Chat with Robert Barnes, Final Cases of Session Resolved by Supreme
Court, Washingtonpost.com, June 28, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/conte
nt/discussion/2007/06/27/DI2007062701764.htm. See also infra Part III.B.
24. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
25. Id. at 444.
26. Id. at 459 n.69.
27. Id. at 514.
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Wright scathingly criticized Dr. Hansen's purported justifications of
tracking as blatantly racist:
Although Dr. Hansen has maintained that the origins of the
four-track curriculum 'clearly precede the event of
desegregation,' there is no escaping the fact that the track
system was specifically a response to problems created by the
sudden commingling of numerous educationally retarded Negro
students with the better educated white students.8
The tracking program in District of Columbia public schools was
clearly initiated in response to the presence of increased numbers of
black students after federally mandated desegregation."
In order to test Dr. Hansen's claims, Judge Wright conducted
statistical analysis that revealed that "[m]ovement between tracks
border[ed] on the nonexistent. 30 Judge Wright found that "tracking
tends to separate students from one another according to
socioeconomic and racial status, albeit in the name of ability
grouping. Students attending the lower income predominantly Negro
schools-a majority of District school children-typically were
confined to the educational limits of the Special Academic or General
Track.,31 Many schools with predominantly African-American
enrollments did not even offer the Honors track. 32 The court held
that "[a]bility grouping is by definition a classification intended to
the basis of that discrimination being a
discriminate among students,
33
learn.,
to
capacity
student's
At least one author has speculated that the clear racism of the
tracking system in Hobson became a de facto standard of proof for
later cases-and it was difficult to prove that any system, however
problematic, was as bad as that in Hobson3 In any event, the
tracking program ruled unconstitutional in Hobson is the program
against which others are judicially measured. But as will be seen
later, the Supreme Court takes a much less analytical approach to
race and education.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 442.
Note, supra note 2, at 1323.
Hobson, 269 F. Supp. at 463.
Id. at 457.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 512.
Note, supra note 2, at 1324 n.45.
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II. Overview of Litigation Against San Francisco Unified
School District
The San Francisco Unified School District ("SFUSD") has been
embroiled in litigation over racial/ethnic diversity for decades. The
SFUSD has faced many constitutional challenges to its policies
regarding race and its efforts to desegregate a city-wide school district
that serves a diverse population largely segregated by neighborhood.
In 1969, African-American elementary school students filed suit
alleging illegal discrimination by the SFUSD against them.35 The
district court held that the SFUSD had practiced illegal segregation
and directed the implementation of a desegregation plan.36 The Ninth
Circuit, however, vacated the ruling, holding that intervening case law
had made clear that evidence showing de facto segregation only was
not alone sufficient to support a court-ordered desegregation
remedy.37 The San Francisco NAACP initiated a lawsuit in 1972,
38 which plaintiffs
O'Neil v. San Francisco Unified School District,

voluntarily dismissed without prejudice in 1976."9 Then, in 1978, the
San Francisco NAACP filed a lawsuit, San FranciscoNAACP v. San
Francisco Unified School District," alleging that a policy of

segregation existed in San Francisco's elementary and secondary
schools. After five years of litigation, the Northern District of
California District Court crafted a consent decree to address the
concerns about racial segregation in the SFUSD, instructing the
district to implement a proportional quota system that admitted
mandated
percentages of students from each of several racial-ethnic
41
groups.
In the years following the consent decree, the demographics of
San Francisco public schools shifted and Chinese Americans became

35. Johnson v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 339 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1971),
vacated, 500 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1974).
36. Johnson, 339 F. Supp. at 1328.
37. Johnson, 500 F.2d at 351 (citing Soria v. Oxnard Sch. Dist., 488 F.2d 579, 585 (9th
Cir. 1973)).
38. O'Neil v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-72-0808-RFP (N.D. Cal. filed
May 5, 1972).
39. See San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 576 F. Supp. 34, 37
n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
40. Id. at 34.
41. David I. Levine, The Chinese American Challenge to Court-Mandated Quotas in
San Francisco'sPublic Schools: Notes from a (Partisan)Participant-Observer,16 HARV.
BLACKLETrER L.J. 39,42 (2000).
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the largest racial/ethnic group in the public school system." Litigants
for Chinese-American students focused on Lowell and its ability
grouping admissions process, arguing that the consent decree and its
racial-ethnic enrollment caps imposed an unconstitutional
requirement on Chinese-American students: In order to be admitted
to Lowell, Chinese-American students were effectively required to
have a substantially higher admission test score than any other
ethnicity. 3 In response to vocal critics of the system, in the fall of
1993 the superintendent authorized Lowell to admit 153 additional
Chinese-American children, while also honoring quotas for each
other ethnic groups, as ordered by the consent decree, resulting in an
overcrowded school and community dissatisfaction."
Subsequently, a group of Chinese-American parents filed suit for
the modification of the consent decree, claiming it had harmed their
children by excluding them.45 As a result of Ho v. San Francisco
Unified School District,the SFUSD was forbidden from using race as
a "primary or predominant" factor in admissions at Lowell.46 Since

2001, the SFUSD has been using a "diversity index" combining five
different socioeconomic factors to determine where a student should
be placed in the district.47 At the end of 2005, the consent decree
under which Lowell had operated for twenty-two years expired.48
Meanwhile, a 1998 report on the ongoing efforts to desegregate
Lowell concluded in particular that ability grouping "often result[ed]
in a disproportionate number of African American and Latino
students being placed in the 'lower' level classrooms."49 The report
also noted, however, that "the majority of educators believe ... that

at least some grouping of students based on language skills and/or
prior academic achievement will enable schools to more effectively

42. Id. at 55.
43. Id. at 56.
44. Id. (citing Nanette Asimov, Lowell High Fails Desegregation Test, S.F. CHRON.,
Sept. 9, 1993, at A13).
45. Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 854, 864 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing
Adarand Constr. Co. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995)).
46. Levine, supra note 41, at 106.
47. Heather Knight, Public Schools in S.F. Becoming More Segregated, S.F. CHRON.,
Aug. 8,2003, at A17.
48. Heather Knight, New Challenges Await School Assignment Plan, S.F. CHRON.,
Nov. 10, 2005, at B3.
49. Levine, supra note 41, at 84 (citing Stuart Biegel, San Francisco Unified School
District Desegregation, Paragraph 44 Independent Review, Report No. 15, 1997-1998, at
30 [hereinafter Monitor's Report]; San Francisco NAACP (N.D. Cal. filed July 31, 1998)).
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meet the needs of the students and the community. ' The NAACP's
efforts twenty years earlier, which were among the first to challenge
assumptions about ability grouping, diversity, and excellence in
education, had largely gone unheard.
Similarly, on the other side of the country, Asian Americans
comprise an increasing percentage of the student body at
academically elite public schools-Thomas Jefferson High School
being a recent example in the news."1 But Jefferson High, commonly
referred to as the "number one high school in the nation,5 12 fails to
offer its educational opportunities to a diverse group of students. For
example, in 2006, it enrolled nine African-American freshmen and
ten Latina/o freshmen (each group comprising about two percent of
the student class of 2010)."
Il.The Berkelman Case: A Missed Opportunity
As noted above, the history of ability grouping and tracking is
difficult to separate from being a product of American racism in the
twentieth century. 4 Specifically, ability grouping and tracking are
linked with efforts to fight desegregation that resulted from Brown v.
Board of Education.55
In 1973, Wendy Berkelman and her daughter Pearl, brought a
lawsuit alleging that the Lowell admissions policies regarding race
and gender were unconstitutional 6 Berkelman v. San Francisco
Unified School District initially raised three questions: 7 (1) whether
the school district could admit students to a preferred high school on
the basis of past academic achievement if the resulting percentage of
students of color is not disproportionately less than students of color
in the school district as a whole;" (2) whether the school district, in
order to maintain equal numbers of boys and girls in the school, could
apply higher admission requirements to girls than to boys; 9 and
50. Levine, supra note 41, at 85 (citing Monitor's Report, supra note 49, at 47).
51. Id.
52. Jefferson is No. 1; Others in Area Make List, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2008, at B3.
53. Mary Kimm, Seeking More Diversity at TJ, LAUREL HILL CONNECTION, July 30,
2008, http://www.connectionnewspapers.com/article.asp?article=317923&paper=80&cat =110.
54. Dickens, supra note 1, at 472.
55. Id. at 473.
56. Berkelman, 501 F.2d at 1266 n.2.
57. Id.

58. Id. at 1265.
59. Id. at 1266.
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finally (3) whether the maintenance of an academic high school like
Lowell was inherently unconstitutional.' °
A. Lowell High School as Inherently Unconstitutional
The Berkelman plaintiffs' initial brief to the Ninth Circuit argued
that by being an academically elite public high school, Lowell was
inherently unconstitutional because students who attended Lowell
received "vastly superior" opportunities compared with students at
other San Francisco public high schools. This discrepancy offended
the Fourteenth Amendment not only through racial and gender
discrimination, but also by "arbitrarily" denying "similarly situated
and equally qualified students" the opportunities at Lowell.6
According to the Youth Law Center attorneys, "the School District
has candidly admitted that there are many more students who are
qualified and able to benefit from the Lowell curriculum than are
permitted to enjoy such benefits., 62 The plaintiffs reasoned that the
denial of the benefits Lowell High offered to students who were not
selected for admission in spite of their eligibility according to test
scores, constituted a denial of equal protection. 61
As documented in the opening appellant brief, Lowell altered its
admissions criteria frequently. Initially, the school extended offers of
admission to any student with a recommendation from their principal.
Later, it based admissions on grades from a semester of junior high
school. Most recently, it created a matrix of factors by which to
screen students and ultimately narrowed the large pool of eligible
students through a lottery.' The plaintiffs in Berkelman alleged that
however academic achievement was measured, there were troubling
questions about the concept of admission standards because test
performance was so directly related to the segregated elementary and
middle schools from which the students came. Berkelman plaintiffs
argued that "attendance at a segregated and inferior elementary
school effectively and irrefutably handicaps such students in the
competition for positions at Lowell. 65

60. Id. at 1266 n.2.
61. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 25, Berkelman, 501 F.2d 1264 (No. 73-1686). I
would like to thank Charles L. Miller and his colleagues at the Pacific Regional Office of
the National Archives for retrieving the briefs in the Berkelman case for me.
62. Id. at 29.
63. Id. at 25.
64. Id. at 8-14.
65. Id. at 51.
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The Berkelman plaintiffs developed their equal protection
argument by citing Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Ellis,66 a

case from 1897 that held that a state classification "must always rest
upon some difference which bears a reasonable and just relationship
to the act in respect to which the classification was proposed." 67 The
Ellis holding may be inapplicable to this case because advocates of
selective public schools can argue that ability grouping is a
classification bearing a reasonable and just relationship to a
legitimate government goal of promoting "educational excellence,"

whether or not in the context of desegregative efforts. 6 But if ability
grouping itself is a vestige of discrimination, then it should not be
upheld.69
Berkelman's lawyers buttressed their argument that Lowell was
discriminating unconstitutionally
with cases such 72as Hobson,'
71
Ordway v. Orday
Hargraves,
Mills
v. Board
of E,
Hrgrves"
.
Mllsv.
oar ofEducation
, B
Bolling v.
Sharpe.7' But these latter two cases were less powerful because their
factual situations were distinguishable and, in the case of Bolling, the

Ninth Circuit deemed similar racial arguments inadequate in a
decision released concurrently with Berkelman.74

The argument about Lowell's "inherent unconstitutionality"
appears to have been unpopular; no amicus curiae briefs were
submitted on it. By contrast, the NAACP submitted an amicus curiae
brief on the racial discrimination argument, relying heavily on Brown
75
and the findings in Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School District.

66. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897).
67. Id. at 155.
68. As described in Levine, supra note 41, at 65-66, and in Ho, 147 F.3d 854,
defendants argued that the goal of "educational excellence" necessitated keeping the 1983
consent decree in place in the SFUSD.
69. Dickens, supra note 1,at 493.
70. Hobson, 269 F. Supp. at 516-18 (holding in 1967 that tracking in the Washington,
D.C. schools amounted to de jure segregation). See also supra Part III.A.
71. Ordway v. Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155, 1157-58 (D. Mass. 1971) (holding that
the Civil Rights Act forbids a school from excluding a pregnant, unwed student from
enrollment without a showing of academic disruption).
72. Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that the denial
of public education to disabled and emotionally disturbed children violated due process).
73. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (the Brown sibling holding segregation
unconstitutional in District of Columbia schools).
74. Johnson v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 500 F.2d 349, 351-352 (9th Cir. 1974).
See also infra Part V.
75. Brief for NAACP as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 1-2, Berkelman v.
San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 501 F. 2d 1264 (No. 73-1686).
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The brief argued that "the law... is quite clear that a school district
may not perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination under the guise
of assigning pupils on the basis of alleged ability., 76 On the issue of
gender discrimination, the ACLU submitted an amicus curiae brief
arguing that the school unconstitutionally discriminated against
female applicants.77
There were also signs that the Berkelman plaintiffs understood
that their "inherent unconstitutionality" argument was weak. In
discussion of the appellees' use of the Supreme Court's affirmation of
a pupil assignment statute in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of
Education,7 the appellants distinguished Shuttlesworth as a facial
challenge.79 This was one of several signals from the Berkelman
plaintiffs that their case was becoming an "as applied" challenge to
gender and race discrimination, and moving away from the broader
constitutional argument put forward in the first brief.8° And indeed,
plaintiffs ultimately dropped the "inherently unconstitutional"
81
argument.
B. The Outcome of Berkelman
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit upheld Lowell's admissions
procedure insofar as it furthered a racially diverse campus. The Ninth
Circuit held that Lowell's admissions practice "substantially furthers
the purpose of providing the best education possible," while also
acknowledging the racial and ethnic disparities of which the plaintiffs
complained.'
But the Ninth Circuit was unwilling to permit the school to
continue requiring higher test scores for female applicants than for
males. In District Court, the SFUSD attempted to justify its policy of
imposing higher criteria on female applicants by asserting that it was
"common knowledge" that boys fare worse in middle school and then
catch up to girls, and therefore boys should be admitted to high

76. Id. at 4.
77. Brief for ACLU as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, Berkelman, 501 F. 2d
1264 (No. 73-1686).
78. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 358 U.S. 101,101 (1959).
79. Response Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 31, Berkelman, 501 F. 2d 1264 (No. 731686).
80. Id.
81. Berkelman, 501 F.2d at 1266 n.2.
82. Id. at 1268.
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school according to a lesser standard.83 But the Ninth Circuit held
that the practice violated the Equal Protection Clause.8' This holding
concerning gender equality in the Lowell admissions process is the
one for which Berkelman is best remembered.85
Although plaintiffs dropped their argument that Lowell's
admission policy was inherently unconstitutional, the Ninth Circuit
nonetheless chose to comment on it. The court distinguished the
Lowell arrangement from the District of Columbia "tracking" system86
that had been held unconstitutional seven years earlier in Hobson.
The Ninth Circuit conceded that the Lowell admissions process was
not ideal, but dismissed plaintiffs' argument that being denied
admission to Lowell caused psychological injury. The court held "the
district's legitimate interest in establishing an academic high school,
admission to which is based upon past achievement, outweighs any
harm imagined or suffered by students whose achievement had not
qualified them for admission to that school."87 But this cursory
analysis neglected to confront the fact at the center of the plaintiffs'
argument: Numerous students who are concededly capable of
succeeding at Lowell were, and are, being denied the opportunity on
the basis of a dubious classification.
Today, Lowell's admission policy and existence as an
academically elite public high school remain controversial. As
documented by local press, SFUSD still struggles with parents'
perception and demands about racial and socio-economic diversity at
public schools vis-A-vis individual students' school assignments."
The plaintiffs in Berkelman posed legal theories that, although
effectively ignored by the Ninth Circuit, point the way to a broader
discussion about ability grouping. That discussion should incorporate
the arguments from Berkelman with current critical race theory while

83. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 57-58, Berkelman, 501 F.2d 1264 (No. 73-1686).
84. Berkelman, 501 F.2d at 1270.
85. See, e.g., Carrie Hoon, Notes & Comments: The Reasonable Girl: A New
Reasonableness Standard to Determine Sexual Harassment in Schools, 76 WASH. L. REV.

213 (2001); Keri McWilliams, Education Law Chapter: Single-Sex Education, 7 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 919 (2006); Benjamin P. Carr, Note, Can Separate Be Equal? Single-Sex
Classrooms, The Constitution,and Title IX, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 409 (2007).

86. Berkelman, 501 F.2d at 1268.
87. Id.
88. Leslie Fulbright & Heather Knight, With More Choice Has Come Resegregation:
Board's Challenge:Reconcile Imbalance with Least ParentalUproar,S.F. CHRON., May 29,

2006, at Al.
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acknowledging the failings of present constitutional jurisprudence on
race, which are discussed in the next section.
IV. The Supreme Court's Contemporary Approach to Race and
Public Schools
Several Supreme Court justices' jurisprudence on race in public
school admissions is presently marked by a one-step analysis: If racial
classification in any form is present, the admissions practice will more
than likely be declared unconstitutional. The majority of the Court
has used that approach regardless of the goals of, or need for, the use
of the racial classification. 9
One of the most recent and notable Supreme Court cases on
education was Parents Involved v. Seattle,' which considered two

school systems' policies that used race to determine children's school
assignments. These policies were comprised of an intricate array of
"tiebreakers" and "integration positives." The district court held that
these policies were "narrowly tailored" and therefore permissible. 9
The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision, holding that
the district's policies that used race as one factor to determine
children's school assignments failed strict scrutiny. 2 In a powerful
dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and
Ginsburg, argued that the race-based assignments helped to combat
prejudice. 9 Justice Thomas disputed the dissent's claim that racial
integration of schools leads to cross-racial understanding:
There is no guarantee, however, that students of different races
in the same school will actually spend time with one another.
Schools frequently group students by academic ability as an aid
to efficient instruction, but such groupings often result in
classrooms with high concentrations of one race or another.94

89. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV.
1,48 (1991).
90. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
91. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224,
1240 (2001).
92. ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 733-35.
93. Id. at 840-41.
94. Id. at 768.
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In his concurrence, Justice Thomas thus acknowledged the reality of
racially segregated ability grouping. 95
Parents Involved came close on the heels of Gratz v. Bollinger

and Grutter v. Bollinger,96 which, respectively, maintained an
affirmative action program at the University of Michigan's law school
on the condition that it would be ended as soon as possible, and
rejected the use of affirmative action in the University of Michigan's
undergraduate admissions policy.97 In Grutter, the Court announced
that all racial classifications-even those purported to advance racial
integration and social justice, like affirmative action-would receive
strict scrutiny. 98
Thus, for the present Supreme Court, "the evil of racism is no
longer individual and institutional acts of white supremacy but,
Neil
rather, [merely] the recognition of racial differences."'
Gotanda, a law professor and critical race theorist, has called this
viewpoint procedural colorblindness and critiques it as destructive
and promoting racial subordination.1" As the late Professor Chris
Iijima wrote of the Supreme Court's "colorblind" jurisprudence in
Rice v. Cayetano,1'° the Court's way of thinking about race
"underscores a fundamental lack of understanding of race's meaning
and significance." ' 02 Georgetown Law Center's Charles R. Lawrence
III argued that with regard to proof in racial discrimination cases,
"racially disproportionate harm should trigger heightened judicial
scrutiny without consideration of motive.""0 3 Lawrence added that a
better, alternative standard would "evaluate governmental conduct to

95. Id.
96. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
343 (2003).
97. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342.
98. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270.
99. Chris K. Jijima, Race over Rice: Binary Analytical Boxes and a Twenty-First
Century Endorsement of Nineteenth Century Imperialism in Rice v. Cayetano,53 RUTGERS
L. REV. 91, 112 (2000).
100. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV.

1, 43 (1991).
101. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (dismantling voting laws designed to foster
native Hawaiians' self-governance).
102. Iijima, supra note 99, at 112.
103. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 320 (1987).
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determine whether it conveys a symbolic message to which the
culture attaches racial significance."''
"Colorblind" jurisprudence is a relatively recent development on
the Supreme Court. In decades past, the Court was more likely to
look beneath the surface of racial classifications for racially linked
injustice. In 1974, the year Berkelman was decided, the Supreme
Court held that the SFUSD's ability grouping had resulted in failing
to provide English instruction to over half of the students in the
district whose primary language was Chinese, thereby violating
Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1"5 According to the Court,
by failing to provide adequate instruction to English Language
Learners, the SFUSD's ability grouping completely excluded English
Language Learners from receiving the same education opportunities
offered to others. °6
Lau v. Nichols in 1974 enforced a federal regulation promulgated
by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare stating: "'Any
ability grouping or tracking system employed by the school system to
deal with the special language skill needs of national origin-minority
group children must be designed to meet such language skill needs as
soon as possible and must not operate as an educational deadend [sic]
or permanent track." '107
When contrasted to Supreme Court decisions in the last ten
years, Lau v. Nichols shows that the Supreme Court previously
evaluated racial classifications more on the basis of whether they
facilitated or thwarted equal educational opportunity. 10' In Lau, the
Supreme Court held that requiring Chinese-speaking students to
attend classes in English did not facilitate equal opportunity because
the students could not understand the content; English instruction
was only constitutionally required in order to meet the standard of
equal opportunity set out by the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1°9
V. Questioning Ability Grouping
It is not clear how much the establishment of academically
selective high schools within a school district, like Lowell and

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 324.
Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974).
Id.
Id. at 568.
Note, supra note 2, at 1338.
Lau, 414 U.S. at 569.
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Jefferson High, differ from the "bad tracking" seen in Hobson."° In
light of the SFUSD's concession that many more students are capable
of enjoying the benefits of Lowell than are granted admission, '" the
harm of the District of Columbia's school system's tracking program
in Hobson may have similarities to that of the elite high school in
Berkelman. In both situations, some students are placed in an
expressly inferior academic context on the basis of alleged lesser
ability. The difference between the harms would seem to be
quantitative or proportional rather than qualitative.
Given the parallels between the two tracking programs,
Berkelman is arguably not consistent with Hobson. Both scenarios
involve students being placed in inferior schools based on
determinations about their capabilities, which are either putatively
neutral but racially tainted, or putatively neutral but arbitrary.
However dubious ability classifications may be, their use persists. As
discussed above, the possibility exists that even Lowell-type tracking
can function as a proxy for segregation. Indeed, there is both
statistical and anecdotal evidence suggesting that eliminating
academically elite magnet schools and exposing all students to "high
track material" can break the cycle of reduced expectations for
economically and socially disadvantaged groups of students."'
Ability grouping and even policies that strive to balance
academic stratification with racial diversity, like those at Lowell, are
not racially neutral. Researchers cite empirical data suggesting that
"race neutrality" is to some extent a myth and impossibility."' At
least as early as Hobson, courts have found that even the facially
neutral "ability" classification is racially problematic. The Berkelman
plaintiffs, in making their case that an elite academic high school was
unconstitutional, argued that ability classifications were inherently
biased. For example, the Berkelman plaintiffs relied on Larry P. v.
Riles,"'4 in which African-American plaintiffs challenged the SFUSD's
use of a facially neutral but actually biased IQ test to determine the
110. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401,514 (D.D.C. 1967).
111. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 29, Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified Sch.
Dist., 501 F.2d 1264 (No. 73-1686).
112. See, e.g., Carol Corbett Burris et al., Accountability, Rigor, and Detracking:
Achievement Effects of Embracinga Challenging Curriculum As a Universal Goodfor All
Students, 110.3 TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD 571 (2008); David P. Hale, The Lowest
Quartile African Americans Taking Advanced Placement Language and Literature, 80.3
THE CLEARING HOUSE 123 (2007).

113. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005).
114. P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306, 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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retarded. "5

The
placement of children in programs for the mentally
Riles court held for the plaintiffs that the IQ tests produced
inaccurate results and promoted racial imbalance, and the court held
that the burden of proof was incumbent upon the school district "to
demonstrate the rational connection between the tests and the
purpose for which they allegedly are used.""' 6
Scholarship on the "score gap" and racial biases in standardized
tests has revealed numerous problems that suggest that such metrics
are ineffective measures of ability, particularly where students of
color are concerned." 7 Research has demonstrated that standardized
tests reward takers for using Eurocentric attitudes and narrative
Racially biased standardized tests inevitably result in
styles."'
adverse consequences for students of color.
Students tracked according to standardized testing are denied the
right to a higher level of academic achievement. In the Supreme
Court case Plyler v. Doe, the Court held that denial of the right to
equal education presents "unreasonable obstacles to advancement on
the basis of individual merit."" 9 UCLA Law School's Stuart Biegel
has criticized the utility of standardized testing:
Not only does the current multiple-choice format embody
inherent limitations, but the predictive value of a given test
score varies due to the idiosyncratic nature of standardized
formats. Key "hidden variables," such as an examinee's
personal background and her possible exposure to certain
attempting to
teaching styles, must be taken into account when
120
make appropriate inferences from test scores.

115. Id. at 1311.
116. Id.
117. For a recent article on inadequacies and biases of standardized testing in the
context of the No Child Left Behind Act, see Helen Moore, Testing Whiteness: No Child
or No School Left Behind?, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 173 (2005). For an examination of
the topic as it relates to law school admissions, see Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the
DistinctionBetween Bias and Merit, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1449 (1997).
118. Leslie G. Espinoza, The LSA T: Narrativesand Bias, 1 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 121
(1993).
119. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1982).
120. Stuart Biegel, Reassessing the Applicability of Fundamental Rights Analysis: The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Shaping of EducationalPolicy after Kadrmas v. Dickinson
Public Schools, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1078, 1102 (1989).
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Academic tracking on the basis of standardized testing denies the
right to equal education.12'
The Berkelman decision was a missed opportunity for the Ninth
Circuit to evaluate the limited utility of ability grouping and its
racialized attributes.
Under the present Supreme Court, the
possibility for federal jurisprudence that examines ability grouping in
its proper context seems increasingly unlikely. In the years to come,
plaintiffs who test the constitutionality of academically selective high
schools should consider history and the particular lessons offered by
past litigation such as Berkelman.
For example, as noted above, tracking and ability grouping have
a complicated relationship to the quest for racial integration. Brown
directly correlated with the reintroduction of tracking as a system of
academic classification. 2 2 Indeed, in many school districts, intraschool tracking was a direct response to court-ordered
desegregation.13 The IQ test, one of the most common measures of
intelligence, has been shown to be biased against African-American
students.2 4 Moreover, while IQ tests are biased against minority
group members, individual biases may also serve to place a large
number of minority students in the lowest groupings."'
Critical race theory legal scholarship has not dealt with
Berkelman in detail. Some authors have sought to explain the result
upholding ability grouping as being because Hobson rejected such an
extremely and obviously unconstitutional tracking system. 126 Thus,
the Ninth Circuit could easily distinguish the policy at issue in
Berkelman from that in Hobson.27
Furthermore, although Plyler v. Doe held that although
education is not a fundamental right, the importance of education
"triggers a corresponding level of scrutiny that falls somewhere
between the rational relationship standard and the strict judicial
review afforded to state action that impinges upon fundamental

121. Id. at 1103.
122. Dickens, supra note 1, at 472.
123.

Id.

124. See generally ELAINE MENSH & HARRY MENSH, THE IQ MYTHOLOGY: CLASS,
RACE, GENDER, AND INEQUALITY (1991) (surveying the biases in IQ and other
standardized tests).
125. Id. at 506 n.47.
126. Note, supra note 2, at 1324 n.45.
127. Id.
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rights."'
This intermediate standard of review could be useful to
litigants seeking remedies for equal protection violations in schools.129
Plaintiffs could argue students placed in lower ability groups "may
become locked in a pattern of test-driven instruction that perpetuates
failure, when exposure to a more relevant and wide-ranging
curriculum might have enabled them to develop their talents and
leave school with skills that multiple-choice tests never measure."' 3 °
Since intermediate scrutiny requires more than a mere rational basis,
it may have the potential to challenge education policies that
unquestioningly accept shibboleths about ability grouping from a
bygone era.
In 1996, Angelia Dickens argued that in Berkeleman the
Supreme Court essentially, and wrongly, rejected plaintiffs' argument
that strict scrutiny should be applied to academic tracking."' Dickens
argued that ability grouping in the Berkelman case was treated
differently from instances of tracking like that in Hobson because the
Berkelman plaintiffs had strategically argued for strict scrutiny,
insisting that the Lowell admissions procedures involved race and
economic status classifications.132
Consequently, the appellants
argued that the burden shifted to the SFUSD to demonstrate a
compelling interest for the use of the classifications.133
These attempts to invoke strict scrutiny failed and as Dickens
chose to put it, "[tiracking was upheld in Berkelman v. San Francisco
Unified School District." 3' Dickens offered this explanation for the
Berkelman result:
Berkelman can be distinguished from the traditional tracking
context for two reasons. First, the classification used to assign
students to the special high school was past academic
achievement. This is not a suspect classification. The level of
scrutiny is much lower than if it had been determined that the
criterion used to assign students to the special high school was a
race-based practice. Thus the school system did not have
trouble proving that the criterion of past academic achievement

128. Biegel, supra note 120, at 1087.
129. Id. at 1113.
130. Id.
131. Dickens, supranote 1, at 493.
132. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 53, Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified Sch.
Dist., 501 F.2d 1264 (No. 73-1686).
133. Id.
134. Dickens, supranote 1, at 493.
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furthered its interest in providing the most adequate education
possible.... Second, the students denied admission to the
special school still receive an adequate education at another
school in the district. The court believed that an adequate
education was still available to those students not accepted at
the special school. ... "'
But the Court was wrong, according to Dickens, because it failed
to see academic tracking as a vestige of racial discrimination, and it
failed to deem13 6tracking a "racial classification" and thus deserving of
strict scrutiny.
In dismissing Berkelman's broadest claim against Lowell, the
Ninth Circuit noted that "Lowell provides in one school a program
which cannot economically be duplicated in ten other schools .... ""7
But Lowell students were concededly somewhat arbitrarily selected.
Thus even assuming the rest of the SFUSD received an "adequate"
education, would that truly inoculate the disproportionate funneling
of resources to Lowell against a Fourteenth Amendment challenge?
Historical evidence suggests that ability grouping is not such a clearly
superior model that it has never been abandoned or criticized.
Indeed, tracking faded in the 1930s and 1940s because in the preBrown era schools could use explicit rather than implicit racism to
fend off African-American enrollees.'
Furthermore, as mentioned
supra, studies had shown little or no benefit to ability grouping." 9
Conclusion
Berkelman was a missed opportunity to address the racial
impacts and overall validity of ability grouping to create elite high
schools. The Berkelman appellants drew from cases involving several
subordinated groups in order to construct a broad argument that
Lowell itself violated the Fourteenth Amendment. These precedents
were marshalled in support of a single contention: That depriving
thousands of students of the advantages of Lowell, including many
who were concededly capable of enjoying its benefits, violated equal
protection.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id.
Berkelman, 501 F.2d at 1267.
Note, supra note 2, at 1323.
Id.
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SFUSD officials assessed applicants to Lowell based on their
academic achievement. Yet, as the Berkelman plaintiffs pointed out
in their brief to the Ninth Circuit, attendance at a segregated and
inferior elementary school impacted-and almost pre-determinedstudents' ability to compete for positions at Lowell.'" This begs a
question that ought to be considered anew by today's legal scholars,
policymakers and educators: Is racially neutral ability grouping
possible? Even if it is, the semi-arbitrary granting to a select few
students of access to special schools like Lowell could itself violate
equal protection-and thus be "inherently unconstitutional." This is
what the Berkelman plaintiffs asserted before the district court thirty141
five years ago.
Over the course of the demographic, political, and
jurisprudential shifts that have taken place since 1974, the quest to
deliver educational excellence without promoting racism has had
On the one hand, critical race theorists have
mixed success.
developed useful tools for examining tracking and other education
practices with racial "taints." For example, Charles R. Lawrence III's
alternative standard 42 for assessing racial discrimination cases offers a
new way to adjudicate equal protection cases that "evaluate[s]
governmental conduct to determine whether it conveys a symbolic
message to which the culture attaches racial significance." But in
recent years, "colorblind" jurisprudence has gained traction in the
Supreme Court and lower federal courts. As a result, injured parties
cannot count on courts to issue rulings reflective of and sensitive to
subordination of racial and ethnic minorities, women, and other
groups.
At the beginning of this Note, I asserted that terminology is
Beyond setting the parameters for discussion, it is
important.
The prohibition on use of racial
important in other ways.
terminology, i.e., classifications, currently hampers law's ability to
assess the advantages and disadvantages of tracking and ability
Likewise, the negative connotations of the term
grouping.
"affirmative action" may hamper discussion of those policies. Going
forward, special attention should be paid to terms like "tracking" and
"ability grouping" because of their ability to shape the debate before
it has even begun.

140. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 51, Berkelman, 501 F.2d 1264 (No. 73-1686).
141. Id. at 53.
142. Lawrence, supranote 103, at 324.
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639

Today, the concerns Berkelman raised regarding gender and race
discrimination have arguably all been addressed. After all, the long
San Francisco NAACP litigation, followed by the Ho suit and the
eventual termination of the consent decree, ultimately stimulated a
thorough conversation both within and outside the court system
about diversity at Lowell and in the SFUSD-but there is more to
explore. Courts should consider whether ability grouping is truly
consistent with Brown. Controversy persists about diversity and
proper allocation of resources in education, in San Francisco and
throughout America. The Berkelman plaintiffs' argument regarding
Lowell High School's unconstitutionality has been overlooked, but it
could point the way to a new conversation about ability grouping. I
hope that conversation will take place guided by opposition to
injustice and a keen awareness of history.

